“Of course, it is impossible to believe in the personal involvement of the head of state in the poisoning. Putin could twice send Navalny to the zone, and he did not do this, obviously, not in order to poison him with Novichok and hand him over to the German special services. On the other hand, I doubt that the verdict is very beneficial to the Germans, who have just begun to build a line of defense against the United States over Nord Stream 2. If we talk in terms of "Who benefits from?", Then first of all come those forces - external and internal - that would like to embroil Russia with Germany. Alas, there are too many reasons to think that these forces are internal - the omnipotence of the power structures in the country clearly exceeds all conceivable boundaries. Which of these so-called "kshatriyas" who became "traders" committed this atrocity, we do not know, but the problem was too definite..."
Approximately the same opinion, if we discard the verbal husks and equivocations, the Kremlin propagandist Margarita Simonyan:
“I don’t know who poisoned Navalny and whether he was poisoned at all. There is no more reason to believe the German special services than there is any. In the absence of hard facts, a person always chooses whom to believe, based solely on his own sympathies and preferences. That is why I prefer to trust mine. Including Omsk doctors. But the fact that if Navalny had been poisoned by order of the collective management, the hell would have released him to Germany - this is an indisputable fact..."
The popular Telegram channel Nezygar goes even further, reflecting on who benefited from this operation and what distant goals it pursued:
1. The story with Navalny is aimed at uncontrolled turbulence and loading of the System in order to break it. In fact, this allows you to return the System to the pre-January assemblage point.
2. Personal blow to Putin personally with the formation of a broad negative long-term agenda. A kind of Russian Gongadze case.
3. Actualization of inter-elite conflicts. His second act (the first was the Golunov case). An intermediate blow to the security forces and the entire power party with the aim of a wide cleansing of the leadership of the FSB and the Interior Ministry
4. The interested parties are clearly grouped around the Democratic Party and its future alliance with the Chinese Komsomol members.
5. The expected radicalization of the non-systemic opposition and protests, which will be redirected to megacities and protest regions.
6. Formation of a protest arc Far East-Siberia-Ural-Center with the radicalization of the North Caucasus.
7. Mobility and permanence of political protest with enhanced reflection on any error of the System.
8. The topic of sanctions will be informationally pumped up and provide tension in expectations; but essentially no one expects serious sanctions.
9. Germany will take an intermediary position; Moscow's flexible response is seriously important. The question is who has stronger nerves, endurance and who will outplay.
10. Of fundamental importance is Putin's planned speech at the UN General Assembly. It can be in the format of the Munich speech, or in the format of appeasement. Although Moscow has the option to refuse it, it will pause until the American elections.
11. The Ukrainian and Belarusian agendas remain mobile and important tools for manipulation and consolidation of negotiating positions.
12. The coming year is a confrontation with the current project of the "British ladle" (Ukraine, the North Caucasus, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Central Asia).