On June 11, an election campaign began in Russia, the elections will be held on a single voting day - September 13. 4 State Duma deputies, 18 governors (two more are appointed) will be elected, legislative assemblies will be elected in 11 regions, and city councils will be elected in 22 regional capitals.
Political analyst Ilya Grashchenkov made a preliminary forecast for the upcoming event on his blog:
“The main challenges for the authorities.
Firstly, a general drop in the rating, in particular of the United Russia party. Although according to sociologists, her rating is kept at a standard mark of 33-34%. But according to unofficial data, in some regions the decline is serious - up to 20-25%, and in some places even below 15%. In proportion to the losses of the EP, the ratings of the Communist Party and the Liberal Democratic Party are growing.
Secondly, in fact, “double” voting, on July 1 - for amendments to the Constitution, and on September 13 - ordinary elections. Double mobilization requiring resources can adversely affect the mood of the electorate, and also creates risks for the growth of protest.
Thirdly, a decrease in the influence of the federal agenda and even a negative attitude towards Moscow. The topic of the confrontation with Ukraine and the USA is decreasing its relevance, amid internal problems with the coronacrisis, but there is no new general “sense line” yet.
Fourth, the problem with financing. There is no "big money" from Moscow, which is usually poured into elections - in infrastructure, social programs, etc. It is also possible to note the low budgets of the election campaigns themselves and, as a result, a drop in the quality of technological work. Among them: a decrease in the role of “field structures” and a bet on the work of commissions, boring TMA, formalism when working with the media and social networks, etc. Fifth, a general decline in interest in elections as a competitive regional policy.
Therefore, unlike in 2019, when the authorities managed to avoid the incidents of 2018 (with the election of several opposition technical governors in the wake of the protest), due to federal injections and technological work (first of all, cleaning the field and mobilizing the pro-government part of the electorate) EDG-2020 looks less predictable.
On the one hand, the loss of interest on the part of the electorate allows us to “dry up the turnout,” and the same sweep allows us to get rid of our strongest competitors (like Levchenko in the Irkutsk region), and on the other, the growing discontent of the population (falling social and economic indicators) and local elites (conflicts with interim, lack of benchmarks) can create the so-called “Turbulence”, unforeseen situations similar to the incidents of 2018.
In addition, so far few can predict how the situation will change by the beginning of autumn, after voting on amendments and the possible “second wave” of coronavirus (and hence a new surge in unemployment).
So in general, EDG 2020 remains a risk factor, there are too many “black swans” that can traditionally take the stage in August..."