All experts and ordinary observers judge the results of the past regional and municipal elections by the officially published general results of the elections and the protocols of election commissions on the voting results, supplementing these official sources with other sources that are available to the relevant expert or observer.
Almost all experts believe that the level of falsifications or “drawing” the “voting results” needed by those in power in the Russian Federation is already quite comparable to the level demonstrated in August this year in Belarus in the interests of Lukashenka and Co.
Among the regions where, despite the actual results, without a doubt, "draw" such election results, which are needed by those in power, Sergei Shpilkin named Penza, Rostov, Bryansk, Tambov regions, the Jewish Autonomous Region, Krasnodar Territory and Tatarstan.
Tatarstan, according to Shpilkin, "in drawing" is generally out of competition.
But “Krasnodar Territory and Tambov Region are, of course, a phenomenon. If you believe the official results, in half of the polling stations in each of the regions, more than 80% of the total number of voters voted for the current governor. This is more than for the amendments to the constitution (in the Krasnodar Territory), more than for Putin (in the Tambov Region) "
“Isn't there any sociologist who will undertake to investigate this phenomenon on the ground? - Shpilkin asks rhetorically. - What is the root of people's love? An important topic, after all. "
Political scientist Alexander Kynev, as if in absentia answering S. Shpilkin's questions, points out that the "ruling class" of the Russian Federation extended the voting process in the past elections precisely in order to exclude all "strangers" from voting.
The general electoral strategy of the "ruling class" of the Russian Federation in recent years, according to Alexander Kynev, has become the strategy "our own people vote, but we don't need strangers", that is, the strategy of "shrinking turnout only to" ours "
How did those in power practically achieve this result, that is, "shrinking the turnout" of voters, predominantly to the turnout of exclusively and only "their own"?
Kynev, in order to answer this question, raises another question: "What is a low turnout?" And he himself answers it: “This means that first of all, administratively dependent voters, that is, state employees, municipal and communal employees, vote. In other words, those who cannot but vote if asked to do so. These people vote in any weather. This is the property of the authorities. "
Sociologist Anastasia Nikolskaya, who also drew attention to the low turnout in the last elections, agrees with him. According to her, “those who were forced to come came. ... simply because those people who were herded to the polling stations, for the most part, voted as they were asked. "
Gleb Pavlovsky, in turn, drew attention to the fact that there has always been a “dry turnout”. It is beneficial to the authorities. They tried to make these elections invisible for everyone in order to technically solve their problems. "
However, this year, in contrast to previous years, “the pandemic factor is still operating, which has changed the selective and generally public behavior of people. People after a lockdown value their personal activity more, and local elections have never been popular. The myth of "depoliticization" is still alive: that everything is decided at the top. It works, and the main decisions are awaited from above, along the line between the president and the governor. The governor did not become a local elected figure. And therefore, local municipal elections are perceived as something secondary, in which you can not participate, preferring to pick mushrooms. "
As for the three-day voting, according to Pavlovsky, it is “a pitiful technological support. Yes, it works until the opposition can nominate the required number of observers. And why? Because the population is not yet very interested in the elections. The governor is a man with Putin's wallet, he spends the money he receives from Moscow, and this is the main thing that makes him interesting. People are interested so that he does not steal money entirely and spend in the region in a way they understand. The governor is not an independent figure who attracts the hearts of the masses. "
However, reducing the turnout exclusively and only to the turnout of “insiders”, that is, to the turnout of totally controlled voters, now not only does not eliminate the risk of “voting the wrong way”, but in some cases already increases this risk.
According to Kynev, the main electoral and political risk for the "ruling class" of the Russian Federation now lies in the fact that these "friends" are increasingly beginning to "vote out of spite". And this applies not only to voting within three days, but also to early voting.
And Sergei Shpilkin using mathematical methods proves: "Where they count honestly, early voting is not a hindrance."
At the same time, Shpilkin explains, "we are, of course, talking about counting, not buying up votes." "Buying votes", that is, "bribery of voters", carried out by any means, is not revealed by mathematical methods and is not eliminated from the voting results.
According to Shpilkin, this time it was relatively “honestly considered”, as far as it can be judged on the basis of the processing of the published protocols of voting results by mathematical methods, only in the Arkhangelsk, Kostroma, Irkutsk regions and the Komi Republic, “which was positively influenced by Gaizer’s landing, and now apparently also Shies. "
Well, how this time in the end for the "ruling party" turned out to be the "vote catch" from among the votes cast mainly by "their" voters?
According to the head of the "Political Expert Group" Konstantin Kalachev, in previous years, "United Russia" considered the result of more than 51% of the votes from the total number of those who took part in regional and municipal elections to be a victory.
And according to the results of the September 11-13 elections, United Russia already recognizes a success in the elections to city and regional assemblies, equal to 25% -30% of the votes of those whom the election commissions noted as having voted.
If, with the exception of Tatarstan and all other record holders in "electoral drawing", the turnout in elections by election commissions is shown in the range of 25 -35% (the average in this case is 30%), then the absolute "electoral catch" obtained in the interests of the "ruling party ”Amounted to about 7.5-8.5% of the total number of voters included in the voting lists.
Kynev and Pavlovsky also say that about 2-2.5% is the total "catch" that the oppositional part of the "liberals" got by using the "smart voting net" and other "gear".
All other voices were shared by those who acted under the flag of the "alternative" both the first and the second at the same time, that is, under the flag of "alternative" to the entire ruling class of the Russian Federation in its entirety.
And although in reality all such “alternatives” are mainly representatives of the lower and partly middle layers of the bureaucratic, “power” and “business” (affiliated with the state) segments of the “population” of the Russian Federation, they voted for them precisely as the alternative, except for which nothing more was offered at this "bazaar".
It is unlikely that all those experts whose assessments we took into account are significantly mistaken in the proportions of the distribution of votes that they cited. And they certainly are unlikely to be mistaken in the social and political (not in mathematical order, but in social and political order) orders of the "numbers" that characterize the past elections.
To the extent that their cumulative assessment is correct, we have, on the whole, about 10% of the votes of all voters in the Russian Federation, cast for representatives of the ruling class.
This is the approximate size of the actual "ruling class" ("el") of the Russian Federation, together with the upper and majority of the middle stratum of the entire "bureaucratic", "power" and "business" apparatus ("budun" = "people-army") of the federal and regional levels. This “budun” organically also includes the regional “nomenklatura” appointed to lead the municipalities.
All this “el” and “budun” in aggregate as one corporation-state called the Russian Federation are real “ours”, and not “drawn” (“multiplied by drawing”) for electoral purposes.
Considered rezultaty_vyborov 11-13sentyabrya 2020, to the extent that they are, as we have just reviewed, evidence in favor of the following conclusions. Namely, the polarization (division) of the RF chimera state into opposing social parasitic organisms, on the one hand, and the social organism of the indigenous peoples of Russia feeding it, on the other hand, has already become an electoral fact.
Do experts from among the “liberals” of the Russian Federation “attracted” by us realize this fact, if it has already become such?
What internal political tendencies are evident in the summer and early fall in the Russian Federation?
“As for the silence after the current local elections, the director of the Center for Eastern European Studies, Andrei Okara, recalled that this often happens in Russia: the people are silent, and then after some trigger event, it turns out“ a Russian rebellion, senseless and merciless”.
Anastasia Nikolskaya essentially agrees with him. She drew attention to the fact that “the situation ... is not as simple as it might seem to someone. ...Also [according to the results of the study of public attitudes in the summer of 2019 - V.V.] ...we received an average score of 4.2 points on a five-point scale (where zero means that there is no conflict, and five that the conflict is pronounced). That is, our society lives in a sense of a serious impending storm".
And according to Ilya Grashchenkov, Russia's domestic policy is in a deep crisis. "In reality, elections are only a reflection of the struggle of large industrial clans, they are needed to form a pool of super-loyal people." For what? Grashchenkov is convinced that for the upcoming political, and possibly not only purely political, battles of the near future, which will inevitably come in the winter-spring of 2020-2021.
Therefore, according to Grashchenkov, in the Russian Federation “now is a period of timelessness, selective selection in its worst manifestation. If earlier there were strategies of Vladislav Surkov, Viacheslav Volodin, Sergei Kirienko also had an application for a strategy - young technocrats, a school of leaders ... Now we have come to the worst version of technocratism. The essence can be summarized as follows: "We will simply appoint anyone, no matter what he does, we can explain why he is handsome, and everyone else is wrong." As a result, we have complete chaos, strange statements by the governors, their inappropriate behavior ”(here and hereinafter, italics are highlighted by me - VV).
All these appointees, not only as governors, but to an even greater extent - as deputies - “are not politicians, they cease to feel the facets of politics, which are oriented not even to the population, but to the authorities”, - emphasizes Grashchenkov.
In his opinion, the Kremlin "understands that it is dangerous." But “why does the Kremlin agree to this? This is stagnation and, apparently, a transfer of power. Nobody cares. Everyone is waiting for the main contours to emerge".
What are the main contours? Not so much the formal outlines of the future system of state power as the clan and personal outlines of the functional and structural organization of the "ruling class" of the Russian Federation.
However, the corporation-state that dominates the Russian Federation as a system, in the words of Grashchenkov, still cannot formulate its own contours, does not really understand what risks and how to deal with them. Khabarovsk is a typical system stupor. She does not understand what to do with him, she is waiting for it to resolve. In Belarus, too, they do not understand what to do, they are waiting. This is a behavioral trend: "Let's wait for it to pass". The question is that someday there will be forces that will not wait and will begin to actively act against - as it was in Ukraine, no one was waiting there".
“I think”, says Grashchenkov, “that elections to the State Duma will be held in March-April 2021. Most likely, after them, when there will already be a Duma, the State Council, a management structure, some kind of invisible struggle will end - the contours will appear. Then we will be told that now we live "this way" and "this way", this is our internal order and laws, such is the paradigm of relations".
Gleb Pavlovsky is even more substantive and categorical in his assessments of the situation in which not only the corporation dominating the Russian Federation found itself, but also the entire “civil society of the Russian Federation”: “The context of the campaign (elections of 2020-2021) is a political_coup_2020, which concerns a wide range of things. The 15-year period of the course of depoliticization as a purposeful policy of Moscow is over from about 2004-2005”.
What are the essential characteristics of this "political coup" that has already taken place in the Russian Federation, according to Pavlovsky's assessment?
“Within the framework of depoliticization,” Pavlovsky says, “a balanced, albeit unfair system was built, where elections played a role - Putin’s electoral tyranny. It first arose as a way of_election_control. Oddly enough, the one who started - that is, the Kremlin - ended this. The July plebiscite destroyed the old electoral tyranny to eliminate uncertainty forever. In fact, it led to the collapse of all of Putin's political culture. We wanted to ensure a perfectly predictable vote forever. But everything turned upside down, and after the July plebiscite, Putin's power collapsed in the circumstances of a spontaneous and chaotic transfer. The next big pass is the State Duma elections in 2021 ”(hereinafter, fragments of Pavlovsky's text are highlighted by me - V.V.).
“In our system, which today is breaking up into fragments and sectors”, Pavlovsky further concretizes, “it is necessary to define a specific actor. Anyone who wants to successfully act in Russian politics after 2020 must get rid of the accumulation of nonsense about the "omnipotent Kremlin" and "Putin's will" from their heads, simply because everything does not work that way".
And how does everything in “their system” work?
“The post-Putin_transit is in progress”, - says Pavlovsky, - “and different people and forces are interested in different configurations of the future. Various coalitions, often shadowy and non-transparent, place their bets. But Putin himself is also making bets. He needs to leave beautifully, but the “inner circle” needs to stay beautifully - this is already a conflict of interests. Today it is generally worth reducing the level of analysis to real situations".
And Pavlovsky immediately denotes this specificity of “real situations” as follows: “It is known that [Chairman of the State Duma Viacheslav] Volodin also thinks about the presidency. There are many such people in power. All of them will come to the surface in future political shifts. The coming political year will be very turbulent. At the same time, the new_political_year must be counted from July 1, 2020, from an unconstitutional plebiscite. "All-Russian vote", the Khabarovsk and Belarusian uprisings, the attempt to assassinate Navalny - this is all a new year, a completely different landscape than the previous years".
But this is from one side, namely from the “existing system of power”.
On the other hand, according to Pavlovsky (this is an absolutely stereotyped ideological scheme of liberalism), there is also a "civil society" opposing and opposing both the entire "existing system of power" as a whole, and the clan groups within it, which in turn have already deployed fight ”with each other.
“In a fierce polemic”, Pavlovsky predicts, “a spectrum of transit scenarios will also form. He is not now, despite the wave of empty reasoning... It will take at least a year or two to put together coalitions, partly including current parties, and partly leaving for non-party civil unions. The coalitions will outline a new disposition of the political spectrum".
“A 'Siberian foothold' has already emerged at the local level after Navalny's targeted attacks in Tomsk and Novosibirsk using the idea of 'Smart Voting', Pavlovsky says and continues. "The communists improved their results in the cities, the New People came forward as the loyal right".
Pavlovsky assesses the political_significance_of_the_elections_of_September 2020, “a Siberian democratic_bridgehead is being formed, which is building itself up from European regions as centralist. Putin himself shook his building, where all regions were categorized. And there was a group of regions that received federal awards for "correct" voting - this is also a certain political economy. I think this principle has started to crumble, and it is important to use this year to break these rusty and archaic drive mechanisms".
And it is in this context that Pavlovsky again emphasizes that now in the Russian Federation, more than ever, “it is important to understand that we are dealing with a different scene, and not with the one that has stood firmly before our eyes for the past 15 years. Where, if the party is agreed in the Kremlin, it is an empty shell, a spoiler ensuring the dominance of United Russia, and the systemic opposition parties are just its subsidiary departments. This was true, but for a different era. Now the growing diversity of the scene is the growth of political conflicts. They are training new political cadres”.
Summarizing this “political coup” and its immediate consequences, Pavlovsky emphasizes: “I could say: turn to Belarus . But I'll say something else: take a look at the Kremlin . Understand that the prize of all future elections was Putin's transit - the departure of_Vladimir_Putin from office, his replacement with more adequate leaders. And not just lobbying shares within the State Duma. When the voter begins to realize that he is already entering the home stretch and overcomes the last mile on the way to the Spassky Gate, you will see a flash of mass interest. We have almost a year for this, and a year is a very long time".
If we summarize as a whole the political and technological scheme by which not only Gleb Pavlovsky assesses the present and projects the future of the Russian Federation, but also all the other experts "involved" by us, representing the "liberal camp" of the Russian Federation, then it is difficult not to see the standard "Matrix of color revolution"...
Pavlovsky, the border, to which he counts for almost a year, considers the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation. But from the Kremlin and the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, information about the postponement of the elections to the State Duma of the Russian Federation to April 2021 is increasingly "leaking".
However, if we compare everything that all these experts testified to us with the history of Russia, then this is an “ordinary” Time of Trouble, unfolding in “extraordinary”, that is, in new historical conditions that have never been before in Russia and in the world.