Boomerang in power: what threatens the bet on security officials and police

An important nuance in the legislative activity of the State Duma of recent days was noticed by political analyst Abbas Gallyamov:

“By tightening the electoral law, the authorities are pushing the discontented into the street. Kremlin logic is clear: security officials are loyal and will somehow cope with street protests.

The problem is that excessive reliance on the power resource will inevitably lead to an increase in the regime’s dependence on law enforcement agencies. As long as Putin maintains popularity and holds power with the help of political tools, the security forces are under his control. After brute force becomes the main instrument of retention at the helm, already he - the president - will be dependent on them. The fact of how this can end is eloquently testified, for example, by the story of the fall of the father of Indonesian statehood and the first leader of the country, Sukarno.

He was the leader of the struggle against the colonialists and, after the creation of an independent state, led a motley coalition of political forces that participated in its formation. In the early years, the country was governed in a completely democratic way, however, as the aggravated social conflicts that clashed during the joint struggle against the colonizers, Sukarno increasingly resorted to authoritarian methods. At some point, the army became the main means of resolving political contradictions for him. The theoretical basis was brought under the course. Saying that Western-style democracy is not suitable for the Indonesians, Sukarno announced the transition to "managed democracy" (a familiar concept, isn't it?). The new concept was based on rather interesting reflections on the nature of consensus, various mechanisms for making political decisions, etc. - no worse than Surkov. The point, however, is not about that now, but that, as the consolidation of power and the transition to authoritarianism, Sukarno increasingly relied on the military. In the end, the president, who put a critical mass of eggs in one basket, lost his freedom of maneuver and was forced to watch powerlessly as army men crack down on the remnants of democracy and take power away.

You must understand that in general, Sukarno was very popular. At some point, a full-fledged cult of his personality developed in the country. The president’s philosophical works were studied in schools and universities, and some of his works had to be memorized. In his honor were called stadiums, cities and mountains. Two years before the overthrow, he was elected president for life. Did not help. The fact that Sukarno rolled the army like cheese in oil did not help, allocating up to a third of the national budget for its financing. General Suharto removed him from power and placed him under house arrest, where the former "father of the nation" spent the rest of his life.

Having made an exclusive bet on a power resource, you become his hostage. Even the most stupid general will quickly realize that it is he who is the pillar of your power. What other levers of its preservation do you have. It is unlikely that at this moment he will not want, for example, to figure out why the financial flows of Gazprom or the road industry are directed precisely to those and not other pockets. Opening several criminal cases, arresting several contractors and top managers, getting evidence from them pointing up is not such a complicated matter. Everything, this is a ready-made texture, with the help of which, in the absence of democratic mechanisms, one can redistribute political influence in the country, and then the power itself.

That is precisely why smart authoritarian rulers do not slip into the final police force, trying to diversify the mechanisms for maintaining power. Looking at what is happening now with the election institute, you see that the Kremlin has departed from this golden rule..."