Question of the day: in whose interests are the laws being adopted in Russia?

President of the European Association of Political Consultants Igor Mintusov published his conclusions about what constitutes lawmaking in today's Russia, in which it is concluded that this process primarily reflects the interests of the so-called "ruling elites".

Confirmation of these theses is easy to find in the last fruits of the lawmaking of the deputies: last week the State Duma adopted two bills in the first reading, tightening the rules for holding rallies and introducing restrictions on the work of journalists.

They proposed to allow the authorities to postpone or cancel actions in the presence of a threat of an emergency or terrorist attack. You can also recognize the so-called picket line as a mass event requiring approval. When covering the event, journalists are invited to prohibit expressing their individual opinions, as well as to hide a certain “sign of a media representative”. That is, such laws are adopted in the political interests of the ruling party, which is thus trying to hide from the opinion of the people.

However, here is what Mintusov himself writes:

“In legal science, there has long been a discussion about two alternative professional ideologies: formalism and instrumentalism. The first - formalism - asserts the absolute autonomy of the legal form in relation to the social world. In other words, law is viewed as a set of laws and a system of rules that do not depend on social influences and are devoid of social dimension (P. Bourdieu). The second ideology - instrumentalism - understands law as an instrument in the service of those in power. Instrumentalism reflects the direct correlation of existing political forces at the moment, which in turn express the interests of the economic and business groups behind them. A second ideology won an unconditional victory in Russia: instrumentalism.

The victorious groups of business interests and the interests of the ruling political party are day and night equipping their "legal" housing: they pass laws or even change the Constitution, primarily in their political and economic interests.

In other words, legislators create laws that are convenient and beneficial to the interests of the ruling political class and the interests of the business that supports it. For example, the State Duma adopts laws to support private “loyal” Russian companies that have come under international sanctions, at the expense of all taxpayers' money (do not confuse the interests of private “loyal” business with the interests of the entire Russian business).

Or, for example, the political ruling class tightens regulation of Russian elections in order to complicate the process of electing candidates other than from the ruling party and to facilitate the process of re-election by themselves. This is clearly not in the interests of ordinary citizens, who are offered a shortened and simplified version of the political menu in voting ballots.

Or, from the latter, the heads of the three Duma committees V. Piskarev, V. Nikonov and A. Khinshtein prepared a bill on the priority of children of law enforcement officers when enrolling in specialized universities. For what? To strengthen the motivation of law enforcement officers to work within the framework of the “instrumental” legal ideology, i.e. better reflect and serve the interests of the ruling political class?

And don't the heads of the same committees want to prepare, say, a bill on the priority of the children of doctors who are now struggling with covid when they are enrolled in specialized universities? Or is it a question of the second order of importance for the deputies of the State Duma? Or does the priority of doctors' children not fall into the mainstream of the current policy?

An example that is understandable for the residents of Moscow. The Moscow Mayor's Office, equipping the city, thinks, in my opinion, first of all, about earning money for the city budget, and only secondarily - about the city's citizens (of course, it also thinks about them. But in the second place, so that all- they were less indignant).

Summary. The laws in Russia are currently, from my point of view, adopted according to priorities, firstly, in the political interests of the ruling party, secondly, in the interests of business groups that support the ruling party, and only thirdly, in the interests of the majority citizens of the country. I would very much like the point “third” to be the point “first” in the current system of priorities. Someday..."

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Analyst Igor Semyonov comments on these theses in his channel:

Mintusov again plays the role of Captain Obvious, drawing attention to the fact that lawmaking in Russia reflects, first of all, the interests of the ruling elites, and it should be the interests of the majority of the people. At the same time, less obvious, but much more relevant meanings associated with this problem hover on the surface:

1. The general public, no matter how weakened it may be in Russia, has already realized this fact, and it is this fact that is becoming the fundamental reason for the impending systemic political crisis. In other words, no usual manipulations, election advertising and propaganda can change the opinion of the majority of voters: the current government (in particular, pro-government deputies) serves the ruling elite to the detriment of the interests of the majority of citizens. The elections to GD-2021, with their politicization, will add to this understanding also the fact that it turns out that this opinion is not only held by many, but the overwhelming majority of the active population of large cities of the country (“people”, “everyone”), and this will happen even before summing up the voting results. And then this majority will suddenly start voting against the candidates of United Russia. And the Russian people simply will not accept other election results. It is this process, which is beginning to emerge, that is now frightening the administration, which is frantically looking for ways to reverse it, split it, or at least stop it.
2. The legislative / representative power in the country is so subordinated to the executive that it no longer depends on the voters, does not represent them in any way, and they already know this. The situation is so bad that even the return of competitive elections and the emergence of pre-election dependence of deputies on voters by itself will not return their trust. Trust in the institutions of representative democracy can only be restored by the sharply populist, confrontational policy of the new deputies, and perhaps by the legislative introduction of some of their responsibility to their voters. That is, goodbye to political stability. But without trust in the institutions of power, the country will not expect anything good.
3. The public is still poorly informed that a feudal estate-based political regime has been established in the country, with an established hierarchy of privileges for representatives of certain professions (a new power nomenclature). Although Mintusov himself gives an example of another draft law on the priority of children of law enforcement officers when enrolling in specialized universities. But after this egregious for the present situation finally becomes the property of the general public (just as it happened with the first question about the real class nature of the current government), this will inevitably lead not only to radical political changes, but to a social revolution. that is, the complete replacement of the ruling elites. Although there is still the possibility of evolutionary changes in the country's structure, in politics, they are slowed down in every possible way, everything is frozen and tightened as much as possible. That is, everything goes to the next sharp Russian breakdown, which is unprofitable for anyone, which again everyone is too afraid to see and prevent in time..."