Posted 17 июня 2021,, 12:00

Published 17 июня 2021,, 12:00

Modified 24 декабря 2022,, 22:37

Updated 24 декабря 2022,, 22:37

"Not a sprint, but a marathon": experts summed up the results of the Biden-Putin summit

"Not a sprint, but a marathon": experts summed up the results of the Biden-Putin summit

17 июня 2021, 12:00
Analysts agreed that the results of the meeting of the presidents of the two countries do not guarantee anything, since the agenda was not to improve relations between them, but only to outline a certain framework for the future.

Experts share their impressions of the Geneva meeting on social media. Political scientist Tatyana Stanovaya outlined eight main results of the summit for Putin at once:

“The first block is establishing preconditions for dialogue and important gestures.

  1. Return of the ambassadors.
  2. “Red lines” moved to “default” area.
  3. Discussion of the exchange of "prisoners".

The second block is building dialogue mechanisms.

  1. Consultations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Department on strategic security.
  2. Arctic negotiations.

(The issues of military interaction, which were on the agenda, remained outside the brackets)

The third block is the management of mutual threats.

  1. The cybersecurity consultancy is Putin's attempt to force the US to establish the rules of the game while threatening to maximize chaos.
  2. An attempt to use the American factor in the Ukrainian case to their advantage.
  3. Finding an immoral balance - we are all murderers, red line breakers and revolutionaries - it's time to make a deal.

In general, about this summit, you need to understand that this is not a sprint, but a marathon. And still to come. But, probably, the common groundwork is the most optimal for both sides, which in itself is rather good..."

Journalist Pavel Pryanikov considered Ukraine to be Putin's main prize in this meeting:

“After the Biden conference, it became clearer what the US and Russian presidents were trying to agree on.

- Ukraine still remains without the "NATO umbrella" and in the relative zone of influence of Russia ("Minsk agreements").

- In exchange for Ukraine, Russia must:

- stop cyberattacks on the USA,

- sacrifice some rights in Syria,

- to sacrifice some relations with Iran.

- Navalny remains a Trojan in Russia's domestic policy. He is guaranteed a comfortable stay.

- Russia is given a probationary period of 6 months to stop the previous hooliganism in foreign policy.

A gradual normalization of diplomatic work between the two countries is also beginning. The previous strategy of Russia to engage in trolling, and not interaction according to the rules of civilized countries, should become a thing of the past. This is good news for the Russian Foreign Ministry; at last, it can do normal business. The parallel "diplomacy" of the elders from the Security Council and all kinds of trolls around the government should gradually diminish.

For Russia, the main gain is Ukraine.

For the United States, the main gain is the revival of mentoring over Russia (as a senior partner). Now let's see what Europe (first of all Germany) has to say about it, which before that was Russia's senior partner ... "

Experts at the pro-Kremlin publication Russia in Global Affairs believe that the long-awaited Putin-Biden summit was perfect:

“The (extremely modest) expectations were justified. Fears (exceeding expectations) - no. What should have happened - the rationalization of antagonistic relations after a period of reckless hysterical booth. The readiness to start working on the new principles of strategic stability and in the field of cybersecurity is an undoubted step forward. The return of ambassadors is a symbolic act that is valuable simply as a gesture; in essence, almost nothing depends on the intensity of the work of diplomatic institutions and the number of citizens employed there. Judging by the separate remarks of both presidents, they managed to touch on a lot: fluently, but not meaningless, quite meaningful. Certain "exchanges" are possible - private ones that do not change the essence of the relationship.

In general, everything was like a meeting at the top of classical times - with concentration, in earnest, with an understanding of real constraints, but without ideological preconception. Verbal entourage is a necessary decoration, the key persons themselves do not get hung up on them. Biden is a figure, if he were younger, any of his interlocutors would have had a very hard time.

The outcome of the meeting does not guarantee anything; improving relations is simply not on the agenda. However, delineating a certain framework is useful not so much in a bilateral as in a general international context. Neither the United States for Russia, nor Russia for America is the main direction of action (and this is a difference from the real Cold War). However, a lot depends on the nature of these relations in how the ties between Moscow and Washington develop with other, more significant partners. Geneva provides an opportunity to think in more detail about the further line of conduct of each of the parties on the world stage.

By the way, Biden's America formulates this line quite clearly - the re-creation of the West in the political contours of the Cold War, the main confrontation with China, a rather restrained line in regional conflicts, in which they prefer, if possible, to find local support partners, rather than solo. Replacing "leadership" with "return" is a very interesting topic that allows Washington much more flexibility.

Russia's priorities are also changing, this is very noticeable if you look at it with an open-minded eye (which is in short supply in the West). However, these changes have just begun, and it is not known when they will acquire at least an approximately slender shape..."

Economist, director of the Center for Research on Post-Industrial Society Vladislav Inozemtsev believes that the parties have remained the same, which, however, will soon be able to change:

“First of all, I would like to note that the very atmosphere of the event was even and calm. As I assumed, the easiest problems to solve were the restoration of normal diplomatic and consular relations (ambassadors will return, mission personnel will increase and, probably, the exchange of prisoners by compatriots (K. Yaroshenko, V. Bout and some of the suspects in cybercrimes may go to Russia , and P. Whelan, T. Reed, and, possibly, M. Calvey - in the United States; here, I note, there is a large field for activity: in the prisons of each of the countries held up to a hundred citizens of the other). In addition, the parties promised not to start against each other nuclear war, which is also good news.

The rest of the meeting left Russia and the United States on their previous positions. Vladimir Putin got the opportunity to keep "a gentleman who deliberately went to be detained" in prison for an indefinite long term (I recall, Biden threatened Russia with "dire consequences" only in case this unnamed person in the Kremlin dies). Russia can still maintain manageable instability in Donbass, as the parties have reaffirmed their commitment to the fundamentally impracticable Minsk agreements, which V. Surkov recently called incredibly beneficial for the separatists. Moscow, however, was offered to refrain from attacks on a number of types of significant infrastructure - but after all, it never confessed to such attacks, so practically nothing happened here.

The most important thing, however, seems to me to be something else. Western media assessed the summit as a clear success of V. Putin (although he himself did not express active satisfaction with its results). So far, this is the case, but the situation could change quickly. As I said a long time ago, in Russia today there is no foreign policy - all of it is internal; the president does not work to assert his country's position in the world, but focuses only on strengthening his personal image in the eyes of Russians. This may lead to the fact that in a fit of "dizziness from success" V. Putin will begin to publicly interpret the results of the meeting differently than his partners would like, or, moreover, act as if J. Biden had surrendered all his positions ( which did not happen at all).

In other words, at the summit, the United States informed Russia that it was ready to partially restore relations in exchange, first of all, for not deteriorating Russian behavior and not taking any new hostile and destabilizing measures both at the level of action and at the level of rhetoric. It didn’t seem to me (at least based on the assessment of the press conference of V.Putin) that this message had been heard in the Kremlin. Therefore, I think that at the end of this year or early next year we will either see a new summit - which will testify to the development of the process that began yesterday - or we will not see it, and then we will face the same thing ahead of us as after the meeting in Helsinki. J. Biden made his conciliatory step, which I would not condemn. Now it is time for V. Putin to respond in kind. Whether the Russian president is ready to live in a world in which his imaginary rival is not perceived as an enemy, we will soon see..."