TG expert: what lessons will Russia learn from the events in Kazakhstan

Political scientist, Doctor of Philosophy Dmitry Mikhaylichenko , in a material written specifically for the Kremlin BezBashennik channel, answers the question: what lessons will the Russian authorities learn from the Kazakh war of all against all?

“I'm not talking about overcoming socio-economic inequality, competitive elections, strengthening the middle class, developing small business, systemic fight against corruption and expanding public control over officials, all this is“ utopian Westernism ”and“ inappropriate liberalism ”. But seriously: in the current state of the System, all these "practices" will not be able to be in demand, due to various, but long-studied reasons. So, what conclusions will be drawn.

1. Unbalancing a super-centralized vertical is evil and a time bomb. There is a question of strict regulation of intra-elite conflicts, of which there are many in the Russian vertical. Ideocracy in the System did not take shape: we are increasingly being offered the role of a national idea to recreate the USSR, but this is not an ideology, but rather a beautiful ideologeme, without a clear program of action and a roadmap (unless, of course, you are not serious about Zhirinovsky's tales about Northern Kazakhstan). The elites at the top are fighting for resources, not moderate conservatives in their convictions. Therefore, it will be very difficult to veto all intra-elite conflicts.
2. Increased attention to diasporas. Diasporas, unlike other elements of the atomized Russian society, show solidarity and are able to oppose what does not suit them. The security officials will pay more attention not only to ethnic Kazakhs living in Russia, including on the border with Kazakhstan, but also to other national minorities, including many who sympathize with the Kazakh people.
3. Growth of migrant phobia. Kazakhs who are coming out in arms against their current government are not just a shock for an elderly (in terms of their socio-demographic characteristics) Russian society, but also an awareness of the threat to their security. Taking into account the massacres organized by migrants from Central Asia on the streets of Moscow, as well as how violently, for example, in Samara, the Azerbaijanis celebrated the Nagorno-Karabakh success in 2020, the level of migrant phobia in Russian society will grow. Aggressive and passionate young people who come to Russia to work are perceived by a significant part of Russian society as an element of potential destabilization. Although there are few Kazakhstani migrants in Russian society, the projections cover the whole of Central Asia. Kazakh riots are not Belarusian protests.
4. Strengthening educational work. The system will use Kazakhstani events as a factor in strengthening the educational component of society in order to form an obedient and disciplined civil, or, more precisely, a subject organism, which will be patient and silent.
5. Not "paid" ones, but terrorists. President of Kazakhstan K.-J. Tokayev has described the rebels as terrorists and speaks of outside influence, although his evidence base is not convincing to many. But the approach itself seems promising. Previously, the governors interpreted any speeches and protest actions as “paid provocations”, and soon, it is quite possible, they will call such actions the intrigues of “terrorists”.
6. There will be no rapprochement with China. The elites have always understood this, but the system needs the China factor in order to use it to maneuver in negotiations with the West. During the Kazakhstani events, China clearly showed that it is ready to support K.-J. Tokayev, and this helped him to hold on. The system hardly liked it, although it was necessary to look for a compromise with the "Chinese comrades". At the same time, the confrontation between Russia and China over the resources of Central Asia in the future of the next ten years seems quite likely ... "

***

And here is how the analysts of the Pskovskie Novosti channel answered this question:

“Will the System in Russia be able to learn from the events in Kazakhstan? The question is almost rhetorical, there are more than enough doubts on this score.

In general, both still open and rhetorical questions remain after the "Almaty winter".

1. The internal elite situation in Kazakhstan is much more complicated than it seems from Russia. The layering of interethnic, clan, territorial, economic points of tension is off scale.
2. The transit of power in Kazakhstan turned out to be very conditional. Silence of Nazarbayev, Tokayev's uncertainty confirm this.
3. The transit in public statements - from "bandits" to "imported terrorists" - suggests that it seems that the main part of the iceberg of intra-elite squabbles will remain hidden from prying eyes. After all, the "bandits" are like their own, Kazakhstani.
4. The fact that the sleeping cells of the "terrorists" have been missed inside Kazakhstan - ok, this is their "internal affair". But where were the Russian special services? After all, they (we hope) also work in this strategically important region for Russia? In any case, the events in Kazakhstan look like a painful click on the nose of Russian foreign policy, even along the closest contour.
5. It is possible to compensate for this damage only by tough (albeit not public) demands for a change in Kazakh policy towards the Russian-speaking population and Russian culture. But it seems that this is not destined to come true.
6. It is necessary to revise the analytical centers in Russia, and they work not only in the Kazakhstani, Asian direction. If you study an object for a long time, then sooner or later it becomes a subject of research - and, as a result, we get a distorted picture of the world.