Posted 20 декабря 2022, 10:25
Published 20 декабря 2022, 10:25
Modified 24 декабря 2022, 22:38
Updated 24 декабря 2022, 22:38
In recent years, Western analysts and Russian oppositionists have very often asked the question: what is the secret of modern Russian propaganda? Why, despite all the seemingly obvious weaknesses, is it so effective that the country's authorities have practically no problems with the support of their policy by the vast majority of the population - those same sacramental 87%? Network analyst Semyon Kogan posed this question to his readers in a historical and international context:
“Have you thought about the fact that under Brezhnev, Soviet propaganda aimed at the countries of the West caused only laughter there.
No one in the 1980s would have thought of jamming the State Television and Radio Broadcasting in English or Vladimir Pozner from the Main Editorial Board of Radio Broadcasting to the USA and England, as RT is now pressuring, because the influence of the State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company or Pozner was zero.
And especially in the USA.
And now the successful subversive influence of Russia and its media on the internal political processes of America and Western Europe is being talked about at every turn!
The fact that Putin's propaganda is a thousand times more successful than Brezhnev's inside the country can still be explained by the processes that took place in the Russian public consciousness after Perestroika.
But how to explain her success among Western audiences?”
Among the many responses, we highlight the answer of Vladimir Gumovsky, who owes his success to Russian propaganda not to his own strength, but to the weakness of the West:
“I would rather pay attention to something else.
This is not Russian propaganda in itself, some kind of super effective - it is just the most primitive, and with the facts in hand it is refuted at once. Its effectiveness rests on three pillars:
These points intersect somewhere, somewhere they give rise to derivative factors, but I would single them out as the main ones.
P. _ S. _
And I would also add to this the important considerations of the benefits of the Western establishment from the current state of affairs and the absence of any opposition to the conditional RT for many years.”
Analyst Klim Tuev , on the contrary, considers the effectiveness of domestic propaganda to be quite natural, and here's why:
“There is a suspicion that modern Russian propaganda, until recently, was relatively freely formed in a competitive environment, had feedback from society, responded to social demands, appropriated successful ideas, etc. This is what made it possible to create universal compositions: such as a white, international traditional progressive katechon (from the Greek ὁ κατέχων - “holding” - a theological and political concept, a historical subject, as a rule, this or that state, which has a mission to prevent the final triumph of evil in history and the arrival of the Antichrist, approx.ed ) and others. What can you think of in the process of searching for a national idea.
Soviet propaganda was formed stupidly from above and was always limited by the framework of ideological patterns ... "
However, the most reasonable answer was given by the network analyst Konstantin Kim , comparing modern, essentially postmodern Russian propaganda with Soviet modernist:
“Because Soviet propaganda, like the entire Soviet project, was a product of the Modern: centric-hierarchical structure, logic with dialectics, the legacy of the founding fathers - all this imposed severe restrictions. Soviet agitprop, by virtue of them, was supposed to be:
But the Russian regime is just like the modern Western regimes, a product of postmodernism. And in the postmodern there is no hierarchy of information, logic is declared a opportunistic social construct, and the deliverance from the chimera called conscience was successful. And this means that you can:
Nothing is true everything is permitted.
And on the other side they understand that it can be very effective. Since they are not at all in the position that they were at the peak of their form during the years of the collapse of the USSR ... "