The main consequence: the war ended long ago, the extinction of the people continues

For the first time, the demographic echo of the Great Patriotic War (the appearance of huge disparities between different generations, as well as men and women) was recorded by the 1959 census. There were almost half of the 40-year-old residents of the RSFSR (the generation of young veterans) than the 30-year-olds. The ratio of men and women at this age was almost the same, and men aged 35-60 turned out to be almost two times less than women. If according to the census of 1897 in the Russian Empire there were 992 men per 1000 women, then according to the results of the 1959 census the imbalance was 1000 to 641.

Only 20 years later, according to the 1979 census, the situation began to improve: there were 784 men per 1000 women.

“The war claimed millions of lives of men, mostly young men, disrupting the normal sex ratio in the population for decades to come. Traditionally, more boys are born than girls, and later, by the age of 30, the sex ratio changes. But according to the 1939 census, there were already more girls in the 5-9 age group than boys. The war that began in 1941 increased gender imbalances in the older generations as well”, - explains Yelena Yegorova, the head of the research laboratory “Quantitative Methods for Researching Regional Development”of the PRUE named after G.V. Plekhanov.

According to the 1959 census, there were almost 2.5 times fewer adolescents born during the war years between 13 and 17 years old than children of younger and older ages. By the 1960s, they had grown up and become parents, and the next demographic hole was formed - "children of the children of war". If before that in Russia the birth rate was 26.9 ppm, then already in the 1960s it fell to 23.2 ppm. In the 1970s, the trend was strengthened by the transition from the traditional large family to a more modern one with few children.

The demographic echo of the war is gradually eroding - it is superimposed on other events in the country's history, such as the collapse of the USSR and the economic difficulties of the early 1990s. The demographic situation is smoothed out by measures to support young and large families. But there is a pattern: the population gaps associated with the war are repeated in different generations every 25-30 years.

Judging by the last demographic pyramid (as of January 1, 2020), the number of 20-year-old Russians is almost half the number of 35-year-olds. A similar failure occurs at the age of 50–55 and 75–78. In 1989, 20-year-olds were similarly almost half the number of 30-35-year-olds.

“Obviously, today we have received the third echo of the war - another noticeable decrease in the number of 20-year-old Russians. Such demographic holes can repeat themselves in cycles for more than one decade. Such gaps strongly affect not only the birth rate, but also the dynamics of the aging of Russians. The working-age population is currently dominated by the older generation (born in the late 1960s - early 1970s) and middle-aged people (born in the 1980s). And there are quite a few young working-age population. For the economy, this is not a very positive moment, because in the era of rapidly changing technologies, younger and more energetic personnel are needed”, - notes Yelena Yegorova.

An even bigger problem, according to the expert, may be the transition of Russians to retirement age in the near future.

“At present, in older ages - 70–80 years old - there are people born after the war, and there are quite a few of them. They are being replaced by the generation of the 1960s - a small one, which will again replace a large generation, which is very important to take into account when analyzing and forecasting the development of the pension system. The decline in the birth rate and the wave-like structure of the population lead to a temporary increase in the burden on the working-age population and a "shortage of grandchildren": there is now one grandchild for two or three grandparents, and ideally there should be an equal ratio", - Yegorova sums up. The consequences of the next demographic hole will be two important moments for the life of society: a decrease in the number of active consumers of various products and services, as well as a shortage of young personnel in the labor market", - says Yevgenia Shamis, founder and coordinator of the research center RuGenerations - Theory of Generations in Russia.

“We have few 20-year-olds, and therefore now it is not companies who are choosing, but applicants. And companies are adjusting. However, do not forget: in other countries and in the global market, the situation may be different. And, of course, the current 20-year-olds will soon be replaced by another, more numerous generation Z, which has been born from 2003 to the present”, - notes Yevgenia Shamis.

How the situation can change in ten years will make it possible to more accurately see the upcoming All-Russian Population Census.